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BALANCING LIVES: INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE DEATH PENALTY AS PUNISHMENT FOR GENOCIDE
(LESSONS FROM RWANDA)
Melynda J. Price*
INTRODUCTION
How can you balance the thousands and hundreds of thousands
killed with the cooperation of the accused? We believe this crime
merits nothing less than life imprisonment.
-Response of Deputy Prosecutor Bernard
Muna to the calls for a lesser sentence for
former Prime Minister Kambandal
Since it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects
who devised, planned, and organized the genocide, these may escape
capital punishment whereas those who simply carried out their plans
would be subjected to the harshness of this sentence. This situation
is not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.
-One of the reasons offered by the Rwandan
Representative to the Security Council for
voting against the resolution to establish the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.2
Violent conflict among Hutus and Tutsis, the two major ethnic groups of
Rwanda, was not new in April 1994. There had been numerous acts of
* Assistant Professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law; Ph.D. Political Science, University
of Michigan, 2006; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 2002. The author would like to thank Tiffiany
Howard, John Newton, David Moore, and others for thoughtful edits and critiques of this work. She would
also like to thank her research assistant, Beth Chemes, for always going a step beyond what was asked.
Though others have helped shape this work, as with its good points, the flaws are all mine. If you have any
questions or comments, please feel free to write: melynda.price@uky.edu.
1 Lawyers Ask for Leniency for Ex-PM of Rwanda, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 4, 1998, at A12.
2 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
Provisional Verbatim Record].
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violence-from both sides-since the Hutus seized power in 1959 in one of
the independence movements that swept through Africa during that period. A
"bloody stalemate" between the Hutu government and Tutsi Rebels3 in 1992
led to the negotiation of the Arusha Accords, which provided for a joint Hutu-
Tutsi government. 4 Seeing waning electoral support for a Hutu-dominated
government, then-President Juvdnal Habyarimana appealed to past ethnic
cleavages and solidified Hutu support against a common enemy: the Tutsis.
The international community was alerted to the impending events when Major
General Romero Dallaire, the commander of the U.N. peacekeeping forces,
"sent a cable to the United Nations Headquarters that the Hutu hardliners were
laying the groundwork for a systematic campaign to kill Tutsis." 5 The Hutus
carried out that campaign with little resistance from the international
community. 6  The United Nations, thwarted by the unwillingness of Member
States to commit troops to stop the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda, "adopted the
position that if it could not stop the atrocities, at least it could take steps to
eventually bring the perpetrators to justice."7  Overcoming debates on the
location of the Tribunal, procedural and structural issues, the objections of the
Rwandan government, and other obstacles, the United Nations passed the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statute on November 8,
3 See U.S. Inst. of Peace, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, Jan. 1995,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandal. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was comprised of
exiled Tutsis. Id. The RPF made repeated attempts to invade Rwanda from neighboring countries. Id. Each
failed attempt was followed by the massacre of thousands of Tutsis within Rwanda. Id.
4 The Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, Letter Dated 23 December 1993
from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, at 1, addressed
to the Secretary-General, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/824-S/26915 (Dec. 23, 1993). The accords called for an
immediate cease-fire, the integration of armed forces, multi-party elections, the rights of all refugees to
repatriate, and U.N. peacekeeping forces. Id.
5 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 53
(1998) (citing Colum Lynch, UN Leaders Had Notice of Massacre, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 1996, at Al).
The cable included details of Hutu militias and weapons stockpiles. Id.
6 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, at 30, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec.
16, 1999) [hereinafter Independent Inquiry]. The United Nations has admitted culpability on the part of the
Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR), and its broader membership for the Rwandan genocide by falling to prevent the atrocities that
took place. Id.
7 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 61 (quoting Genocidal Slaughter Claims as Many as 1 Million, 31
U.N. CHRONICLE 4, 12 (Dec. 1994)). See also Human Rights Watch, RwandalZaire: Reaffirming with
Impunity, May 1995, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Rwandal.htm.
[Vol. 21
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1994, by a vote of thirteen in favor, one abstention (China), and one against
(Rwanda).8
Contrary to the Rwandan penal code, the statute authorizing the ICTR does
not allow for the imposition of the death penalty.9 This inconsistency is
important because Rwanda supported the establishment of a tribunal and
participated in the drafting of the statute. In the end, Rwanda voted against the
resolution establishing the ICTR, pointing specifically to the absence of the
death penalty as one of the main reasons for its disapproval, as well as the
resulting political implications of the discrepancies in sentencing among those
tried in the ICTR and those tried in Rwanda's domestic criminal courts. 10 The
discrepancy between the Rwandan penal code and the ICTR statutes allows
architects of the atrocities to escape the death penalty while those with lower
ranks, who are being tried in Rwandan courts, can be sentenced to death."
The appropriateness of the death penalty as a form of punishment is the subject
of a great deal of controversy in the international human rights community.
Most of the western world-with the notable exception of the United States-
and the continent of Africa has moved toward abolishing capital punishment,
either de jure or de facto.
The potential inconsistency between domestic punishment policy and
acceptable modes of punishment in the international community raises several
important questions for the meaning of individual accountability in
international law. Should those convicted of human rights violations, such as
genocide, be put to death for their crimes? Does this inconsistency reflect
conflicting views on one type of punishment-the death penalty-among
international and domestic legal communities or a more profound conflict over
the appropriate prosecution of participants in genocide? Can other societies,
under the auspices of international law, impose their views of justice onto the
people of Rwanda who in theory support the death penalty? Lastly, is it also
an injustice for those being tried for the same acts to receive such drastically
8 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, at 16, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
9 See id. art. 23. Sentencing under the ICTR Statute is limited to imprisonment and orders concerning
the disposition of unlawfully appropriated property. Id. The length of prison sentences is determined by the
"general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda." Id.
10 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2.
1 James McKinley, Jr., As Crowds Vent Their Rage, Rwanda Publicly Executes 22, N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 25,
1998, at Al. Twenty-two people were executed before a crowd of tens of thousands in a soccer stadium in
Kigali. Id.
20071
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different punishments? The most basic understanding of fairness suggests this
is an injustice.
The purpose of this Article is not to answer the question of whether the
death penalty is an appropriate punishment for genocide.12  One could safely
argue that there is an emerging norm in international law against the death
penalty, but individual countries have maintained their right to use the death
penalty and continue to do so in code and in practice.' 3 This Article, using
Rwanda as a case study, evaluates the real outcomes of such discrepancies in
punishment at the domestic and international level, and the ability of both
approaches to bring justice to the victims of genocide. Both domestic and
international statutes articulate similar goals in prosecuting the perpetrators of
genocide-eradicating a culture of impunity, and restoring law and order. This
Article argues that the existence of conflicts over the propriety of the death
penalty and the resulting punishment discrepancies provide continued
opportunities for development of domestic and international responses to
genocide.
Part I summarizes the events in Rwanda that led to the establishment of the
Tribunal and discusses the resulting statutes of the ICTR and the domestic
criminal statues of Rwanda. This section also discusses the additional legal
and political issues that have arisen from the discrepancy in punishment
regimes. Part II offers two case studies to illustrate the types of actors and the
extent of participation in the genocide tried under each regime. This section
also outlines the goals of punishment articulated in each statute and how well
these case studies reflect those goals. Part I1 questions the appropriateness of
death as punishment for individual participation in international crimes. On
12 For a clearly articulated discussion of this question, see Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty
to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 747 (2005).
13 The norm of a prohibition against the death penalty is "emerging" because there is still debate over
whether the opposition to the death penalty in the international community is a norm. For examples of those
who argue or suggest that the prohibition on the death penalty is an international norm, see WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002). See also Ursula
Bentele, Back to an International Perspective on the Death Penalty as a Cruel Punishment: The Example of
South Africa, 73 TuL. L. REV. 251, 254 (1998); Joan Fitzpatrick & Alice Miller, International Standards on
the Death Penalty: Shifting Discourse, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 273 (1993); Michelle McKee, Note, Tinkering
With the Machinery of Death: Understanding Why the United States' Use of the Death Penalty Violates
Customary International Law, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 153 (2000). For examples of scholars who argue or
acknowledge that a prohibition on the death penalty has not reached an international norm, see Ohlin, supra
note 12; William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
797, 799 (1998). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. f (1987).
[Vol. 21
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the one hand, a majority of nations have moved toward the abolition of the
death penalty; however, under Rwandan domestic laws, the death penalty
remains a codified and utilized component of the penal code. There is
sufficient political will in the international community to bar its use in
international tribunals, but abolition has not yet reached the level of
international norm. At the core of international law is a necessity for
consensus, which promotes higher levels of compliance. Since Nuremberg,
there is consensus that genocide is a crime, but the appropriate form of
punishment is highly contested. There is also discussion of the employment of
pre-colonial methods of adjudication as a way of expediting trials and
providing real opportunities for reconciliation on the ground in Rwanda. The
Article concludes with a discussion of the prospects for resolution of the
punishment paradox in genocide prosecution created by opposing policies on
punishment in domestic and international law. The resolution of this paradox
may be too late to prevent the negative political consequences of differences in
punishment in the Rwandan genocide, but the looming presence of genocide
and possible tribunals in other parts of Africa, most specifically in the Sudan,
continues to make analysis of this tension between international and domestic
law on the death penalty important. The final section outlines concrete lessons
that both the international community and domestic authorities can learn from
the adjudication of the Rwandan genocide and apply to other prosecutions of
participants in genocide.
I. THE GENOCIDE AND THE RESULTING STATUTE
A. The Genocide
Over 800,000 men, women, and children were slaughtered in Rwanda over
a 100-day period from April to July 1994.14 This particular episode of
violence was triggered by the death of President Juvdnal Habyarimana in a
plane crash and resulting rumors that the opposition Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF) shot the plane down, even though "evidence suggests that the Hutu
hardliners might actually have been responsible."' 5 Within hours of the crash,
14 Independent Inquiry, supra note 6, at 1. To demonstrate the extent of the killing and violence in
Rwanda, the representative of Rwanda to the Security Council explained, "in a country the size of the United
States this would be equivalent to the loss of over 37 million Americans in under three months." Provisional
Verbatim Record, supra note 2, at 16.
15 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 53 (citing Philip Gourevitch, After the Genocide, NEW YORKER,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 87).
20071
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civilian Tutsis and moderate Hutu civilians and politicians were hunted and
killed. 16  The Presidential Guard, the Rwandan armed forces, and the
interahamwe militia began systematically killing Tutsis in Kigali. 17 They went
from house to house, executing every person present-men, women, and
children. Many Tutsis sought refuge in churches, hospitals, schools, and with
international aid groups, such as the Red Cross. They were murdered
wherever they were found.'
8
The interahamwe's main goal was the murder of Rwanda's Tutsi
population, but killing was not their only activity. Numerous Tutsi women
were also victims of assorted forms of sexual violence. 19 From Kigali, the
armed militias spread throughout the countryside, committing acts of violence
and sexual torture from village to village.20 The intimate nature of the violence
in Rwanda makes the issue of prosecution and punishment extremely
important.21 In a situation where genocide is perpetrated by neighbors-or in
16 See U.S. Inst. of Peace, supra note 3. The violence was fomented by broadcasts on Radio Rwanda,
the Rwandan national radio station, and urged on even stronger by the private Radio des Milles Collines,
which encouraged any Hutus within hearing range to murder more Tutsis. Paul Watson, Testament to
Genocide, TORONTO STAR, July 23, 1994, at BI. Not only radio announcers, but also artists have been
accused of using their talents to fuel the violence. Simon Bikindi, a famous Rwandan singer, has been tried in
the ICTR for "using his songs to incite extremists to kill Tutsis." The civilian death squads used Bikindi's
music to mobilize youth to join their killing machine. Genocide Trial of Rwandan Musician Opens at UN
Court, BBC MONITORING, Sept. 19, 2006.
17 U.S. Inst. of Peace, supra note 3. In Kinya-rwanda, the Rwandan national language, interahamwe
means "those who attack together." Id. The interahamwe militia was formed in 1992 after a speech by L~on
Mugesera, an officer in President Habyarimana's government, in which he encouraged Hutus "to kill Tutsis
and to dump their bodies in the rivers of Rwanda." The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, 63, delivered to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Final Report]. The three-week long
programs "involved the indoctrination of groups of 300 men in ethnic hatred against the Tutsi minority. The
programs also propagated information on methods of mass murder." Id. 65.
18 Final Report, supra note 17, 70.
19 See Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its
Aftermath, Sept. 1996, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm. The intensity of the killings in Rwanda
has tended to overshadow other acts of violence like rape, which is acted out almost exclusively on the bodies
of women. See id The number of women raped in Rwanda continues to be unclear, but it is estimated that
tens of thousands of women were subject to widespread sexual violence during the 1994 genocide. See id.
20 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 53.
21 The intimate nature of the violence has been captured in several recent films on the genocide, such as
the Academy Award-nominated film Hotel Rwanda. HOTEL RWANDA (MGM 2005). These films have also
portrayed the different approaches to accountability taken both domestically and by the international
community. In the film, Sometimes In April, the filmmakers portray the testimony of a Rwandan genocide
victim against his brother in the ICTR and the testimony of genocide victims against neighbors in traditional
courts (gacaca). SOMETIMEs IN APRIL (HBO Home Video 2005). Other fictional accounts, like the J.T.
Rogers play The Overwhelming, have provided vivid accounts of the extent and intimacy of the violence
during this period in Rwanda. Additionally, foreign media has attempted in recent years to shed light on the
(Vol. 21
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some instances, by family members-the current international trend of
removing and prosecuting those at the highest levels of planning and
organization may not satiate all the calls for justice or support the end goal of
re-establishing the rule of law.
According to one account of the ICTR, "the responsibility for the Rwandan
genocide is shared in varying degrees by three categories of individuals: (1) the
planners, (2) the 'military' superiors and subordinates and (3) the unwilling
accomplices. ' 22  The first group, the planners, consisted of high-level
government officials or other influential persons who encouraged or instigated
violence. 23 The second group included those military personnel who actually
supervised the killing.24 The third group, unwilling accomplices, includes those
who killed under the supervision of the previous two categories and who made
up the majority of the interahamwe.25  This group has been described by the
human rights organization African Rights as follows:
events of the Rwandan genocide and the failure of the international community to intervene. See UN Must Act
on Burma, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Sept. 4, 2007, at A10 (discussing the moral failure of the United Nations
to intervene in the Rwandan genocide); Lucy Bannerman, Four in Court on Genocide Charges, TIMES
(London), Dec. 30, 2006, at 27; John Swain, Rwanda Suspects on UN Genocide Panel, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 16,
2006, at 13; Amelia French, Women Break Their Silence Over the Rape of Rwanda, INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 10, 1997, at 7; Paul Cullen, President Criticises UN Failure on Human Rights, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 3,
1997, at 5.
22 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 55.
23 Id. This group included Agathe Habyarimana (the wife of the President), Jean Kambanda (the Prime
Minister), Agnes Ntamabyariro (the Minister of Justice), and Augustine Bizimana (the Minister of Defense).
The owners and operators of the National Radio, Radio Mille Colline, several members of President
Habyarimana's family, and a variety of other officials in the Habyarimana government are also counted in this
group. Id. at 55-57.
24 Id. at 57.
25 Id. at 58. There is great debate over the actual level of coercion within this group. Compare AFRICAN
RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR, AND DEFIANCE 570 (1994) ("Using propaganda, bullying, the promise of
looting and outright force, many ordinary people were made into members of the interahamwe, and were
compelled to kill."), with Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, International Justice for Rwanda Missing the Point:
Questioning the Relevance of Classical Criminal Law Theory, 13 BOND L. REv. 190, 202 (2001) (Austl.)
("What induced so many individuals to participate was not coercion, but rather genuine support of the idea that
the Tutsi had to be eliminated, together with the pursuit of solidarity with others in attaining this goal."). It
cannot really be resolved until more and better adjudication of the detainees in Rwanda provide greater
information for substantial analysis. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the
Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 545, 585 (1998). This group
appears similar to the Einsatzgruppen, the group of non-soldiers (arguably) who committed many of the
murders outside of the concentration camps in Nazi Germany. The Einsatzgruppen are blamed for the majority
of the murders of the Rroma (Gypsies), killed by the Einsatzgruppen outside of the concentration camps. For
similar explanations of how "ordinary" Germans participated in genocide, see DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1997).
2007]
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The interahamwe were sent to rural areas not just to kill, but also to
force the local people to kill. Often, people were compelled to kill
their neighbors or members of their own families. The extremists'
aim was for the entire Hutu populace to participate in the killing.
26
Estimates are that half of the Rwandan Hutu population participated in the
27genocide, which makes the job of accountability and reconciliation very
complicated.
B. The Statutes
The Security Council established the ICTR "for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and
31 December 1994." 28 In Rwanda, the statutory basis for genocide prosecution
at the national level is the Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity
Committed Since October 1, 1990.29 Both the ICTR statute and the Rwandan
Organic Law cover the same basic crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity,
and offenses collateral to genocide. The statutes are also similar in that they
both require the creation of entirely new court systems-the Tribunal and the
Rwandan court system.30 Rwanda's court system was completely destroyed by
the genocide. The statutes and resulting prosecutorial systems differ on
several important issues: the temporal reach, the categories of defendants they
prosecute, the scope and quality of the prosecution, and the punishment
permissible.
The Tribunal covers only crimes that occurred between April and July
1994, which includes the events just prior to the death of Habyarimana until
the RPF defeated the government forces in July. The Rwandan government
26 AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at v.
27 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 58.
28 S.C. Res. 955,1 12, U.N. Doc. S/1NF/50 (Nov. 8, 1996).
29 Organizations of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against
Humanity Committed Since 1 October 1990, Organic Law No. 08/96 (Aug. 30, 1996), in OFFICIAL GAZETnE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA (Sept. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Organic Law].
30 Compare id. with S.C. Res. 955, supra note 28.
31 William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for
Solution to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L. F. 523, 533 (1997). Prior to genocide, "the Rwandan legal system
has never been more than a corrupt caricature of justice." Id. at 531.
[Vol. 21
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objected to the ICTR's limitation to such a short span of time.32 The Organic
Law covers a ten-year period reaching back to the point in 1990 when rural
Tutsis were attacked as a part of the Habyarimana regime's punishment for a
failed RPF invasion. 33  The Organic Law ends with the date of the RPF
consolidation of power. 34 Despite the Rwandan government's willingness to
greatly expand the reach of the domestic trials, there are several notable
exclusions. The law excludes: (1) the massacres of Tutsis in the 1960s, (2) the
torture and imprisonment of Hutus who opposed the government during the
Habyarimana Regime, and (3) those crimes committed by the RPF after it
consolidated power.
35
In addition to differences in temporal reach, the two courts prosecute
different categories of defendants. In keeping with the statute, ICTR
prosecutions have largely focused on high-level government officials, leaving
the rank-and-file participants in the genocide to be tried in Rwandan courts.
3 6
Under the Organic Law, there are four categories of offenders who may be
found culpable:
Category 1: Planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors, and
leaders of the crime of genocide or crimes against
humanity; notorious murderers; persons who
committed acts of sexual torture
Category 2: Perpetrators, conspirators, or accomplices of
intentional homicide or serious assaults against the
person causing death
Category 3: Persons guilty of other serious assaults against the
person
Category 4: Persons who committed offenses against property
Category 1 offenders can receive the death penalty.37
32 See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 501, 505 (1996).
33 Drumbl, supra note 25, at 580.
34 id.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 625.
37 Id. at 581-82. Four years later, only 300 suspects had been prosecuted through these courts. Id. at
20071
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Due to scarce resources in Rwanda, there is also a drastic difference in the
number of defendants and the quality of the adjudication process available to
the defendants in each court system. The ICTR has completed twenty-four
cases, is in the process of trying twenty-eight persons, and has an additional six
suspects awaiting trial in a U.N. Detention Facility outside of Arusha,
Tanzania. 38  Current estimates are that there are 66,000 people accused of
genocide imprisoned in Rwanda. 39 The Organic Law gives specific timelines
40for filing charges and appearing before a judge. These deadlines have come
and gone for most of the detained suspects. Because arrests were largely based
on denunciation, observers believe that there are large numbers of innocent
people being detained.4n  The long periods of detention with no movement
toward prosecution encourages the belief among detainees that they are in
42custody as part of a continued conflict between Hutus and Tutsis.
The differences in the two laws result from a broader disagreement over the
need for, and the propriety of, the death penalty. The ICTR statute allows a
maximum penalty of life in prison; Rwandan law allows the death penalty.43
The Rwandan representative to the Security Council articulates the goals of
prosecution as "build[ing] a state law and arriv[ing] at true national
reconciliation" and "eradicating the culture of impunity which has
characterized [Rwandan] society since 1959." 44 The Rwandan representative
argued that the death penalty was a necessary tool to reach this goal.45 When
Rwanda objected at the U.N. hearings to the absence of a provision for death in
the ICTR statute, the representative from New Zealand best articulated the
U.N. position: "For over three decades the United Nations has been trying
progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely
unacceptable-and a dreadful step backwards to introduce here [at the
ICTR]. ' 46  Such statements reflect the sentiments of the majority of the
38 See United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.ictr.org (last visited Jan.
16, 2008).
39 International Centre for Prison Studies, Prison Brief for Rwanda, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/
worldbrief/africarecords.php?code=39 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
40 Organic Law, supra note 29.
41 Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1221, 1228 (2000).
42 Id. at 1288-89.
43 See ICTR Statute, supra note 8; Organic Law, supra note 29. For the Security Council debate on the
establishment of the ICTR and the issue of capital punishment, see Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2.
44 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2.
45 id.
46 id.
[Vol. 21
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international community and the willingness of the international community to
assert its position even in the face of support for the death penalty from those
who were the victims of the genocide. As of 2007, a majority of nations have
abolished the death penalty, de jure or de facto. Even the United States,
which continues to utilize the death penalty, has referenced international
sentiments in recent prohibitions on the use of the death penalty for minors .48
Since the adoption of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, the majority of U.N. Member States have recognized
the individual's interest in her own life and her right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of life.4 9  The ICCPR did not abolish the death penalty, but it
exemplifies an international trend toward abolition.50  As early as 1983, the
Council of Europe amended its convention to abolish the death penalty. 5 1 In
1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, which is explicit in its aim of abolishing the death penalty.52 Twenty-
five states on the African continent are classified as abolitionist. 53  Of the
countries that retain the death penalty, most of the executions take place in
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.54  The United States, a
signatory to the ICCPR, has defended its use of the death penalty despite
47 See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Death Penalty Information Center, Mar. 13, 2007, http:/I
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.pho?scid=30&did=140. Currently, 128 countries have abolished the death
penalty, and sixty-nine countries have retained the death penalty. Id.
48 Roper v. Sinmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2003). In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court discussed
the international prohibition of the execution of minors as one justification for prohibiting the practice in the
United States and held the practice to be unconstitutional. Id. Among other sources, the Court referenced
international law to justify its opinion. Id. However, not every member of the Court has supported the
reference to international law. In a different dispute, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
stated that the majority erred in giving "weight [to] foreign laws, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion," arguing that the only relevant evidence in
deciding constitutional questions are the actual laws or the application of those laws. See Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
49 D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 638 (5th ed. 1998). The only countries
abstaining were the several members of the then-Soviet Block, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Id. at 636.
50 id. at 638-39.
51 Eur. Consult. Ass., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Europ. T. S. No. 114 (1983).
52 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/128 (1989).
53 William A. Schabas, African Perspectives on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL SOURCE BOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 31, 31 (William A. Schabas et al. eds., 1997).
54 See Death Penalty Info. Center, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, http:Hwww.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=127&scid=30#interexec (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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criticism that it violates the object and purpose of the treaty.55 Some scholars
have countered this argument by suggesting that the continued use of the death
penalty is not sufficient to say that the United States is violating the object and
purpose of the treaty. 56 The United States only had to reserve on the issue of
the death penalty for juveniles, which was barred under the ICCPR.57 This
reservation is no longer required with the 2005 Supreme Court decision in
Roper v. Simmons, which held the execution of minors under age 18 to be
unconstitutional.58 Scholars who defend the continued use of the death penalty
but for this category of defendants argue that the United States takes a different
interpretation of the treaty's object and purpose.59 Rwanda on the other hand
has not made a similar attempt to defend its departure from its own history or
international trends. This failure, among other things, has led to criticism that
the use of the death penalty in the Rwandan prosecutions is essentially
retaliation for the 1994 genocide.
60
II. DIFFERENCES IN DEFENDANTS IN THE TWO COURTS: THE INTERAHAMWE
AND JEAN KAMBANDA
A. The Interahamwe
"Rise up Rwanda, you are supported by the Interahamwe, those who join
together for a common cause. ' 61 This song that once called citizens together
for a common good is now synonymous with murder and incredible brutality.
Interahamwe translates as "those who work together" and refers to the "system
of communal labor in Rwanda where village men joined forces to repair roads
and cut firewood. ' '62  Prior to the death of President Habyarimana, whichprecipitated the most recent ethnic killing, the interahamwe was the youth
55 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 399, 436-37 (2000).
56 See id. at 403.
57 id.
58 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,578-79 (2005).
59 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 433-35.
60 Drumbl, supra note 25, at 607. Philip Gourevitch rejects conflation of the war with the genocide. See
Gourevitch, supra note 15, at 98-99. Gourevitch concludes that "[ajlthough the genocide coincided with the
war, its organization and implementation were quite distinct from the war effort. In fact, the mobilization for
the final extermination campaign swung into full gear only when Hum Power was confronted by the threat of
peace." Id.
61 Robert Block, The Young Who Kill Without a Qualm, INDEPENDENT (London), July 10, 1994, at 11.
62 Paul Salopek, Guerrillas Haunt Jungles of Congo, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1999, at N 1.
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wing of the ruling Hutu party.63  According to a former member now in a
Kigali prison, "We were just young people, not militias. Originally we were
not together for fighting but thinking."
64
In the early 1990s, Hutus radicalized a once-benign program into an armed
militia "imbued with a vitriolic anti-Tutsi ideology as the government's war
against the rebels [RPF] escalated. ' 65 The intimate method of killing, which
for the interahamwe was typically the use of machetes, required significant
manpower and direct action. Many individuals participated in the killings at
67
a hands-on level. The interahamwe, who drew from all strata of Rwandan
society, viewed their Tutsi neighbors, colleagues, and, in some cases, relatives
(due to the high level of intermarriage between the two groups) as the enemy.68
Others-like Robert Kajuga, the president of the Hutu militia-placed the
blame with the RPF and viewed the actions as self-defense.
69
In addition to views of interahamwe actions as self-defense, Kigali jails are
rampant with stories of coercion and innocence.70 Again, because most of the
domestic arrests were based on denunciation, the number of innocent among
those imprisoned is thought to be very high. 7 1 Despite years of imprisonment,
few are willing to confess. Some admit to being members of the interahamwe,
but not participating in the violence-a sort of "guilt by association."
72
63 Block, supra note 61.
64 id.
65 Salopek, supra note 62; Chris McGreal, Life Sentence for Rwanda Genocide Leader, GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 7, 1999, at 14.
66 Block, supra note 61.
67 Drumbl, supra note 41, at 1238.
68 There is some debate as to whether or not the Hutus and Tutsis are actually two distinct ethnic groups
because they share a common language, history, and religion, as well as similar diet, music, art, and culture.
PHILIP GoUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT ToMoRRow WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES:
STORIES FROM RWANDA48 (1998). The similarities between the Hutus and the Tutsis challenge traditional
understandings of the nature of ethnic violence and may signal a need to refine current definitions of genocide.
Id. at 210-11.
69 Lindsey Hindus, Hutu Warlord Defends Child Killing, OBSERVER (London), July 3, 1994, at 15.
Kajuga, the seminary-educated son of an Anglican minister, was the national president and founder of the
interahamwe in 1990. Id He exemplifies the difficulty of creating a representative profile of the
interahamwe. Id.
70 Drumbl, supra note 25, at 607.
71 See GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE 323 (1995). "Denunciation of
Hutus as former interahamwe were common, just to get somebody out of the way and appropriate his house or
land." Id. This method of arrest has led to false accusations. Id. Due to the level of chaos in the Rwandan
criminal justice system, there is no way to know how many such accusations have occurred and whether they
will be remedied. Id.
72 id.
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Variations of this kind of guilt due to status rather than guilt due to action,
coupled with the minimal infrastructure, only prolong the process of justice in
Rwanda.
Execution of the innocent has become a major component of the capital
punishment debate in the United States and a major source of criticism by the
international community of the continued use of death as punishment.
73
Though it is sometimes difficult to differentiate legitimate claims of innocence
from those seeking to avoid accountability for their role in the genocide, this
kind of uncertainty has reinvigorated opposition to the death penalty both
within and outside of the United States.74 The reliance on denunciations as the
main evidence for conviction also makes the use of capital punishment
troublesome.75 When one adds to the mix the failure to provide adequate legal
representation or other legal structures to those being detained in Rwandan
prisons, most of the major objections to the use of capital punishment are
realized in the Rwandan domestic courts.
The result of the low number of convictions in Rwanda's domestic courts is
that the number of death sentences carried out is small relative to the number
of people detained.76  But with the trials continuing and the process
increasingly politicized, it is not clear what role further convictions and
sentences will play in the attempts to counter the culture of impunity that
existed prior to the 1994 genocide and possibly still exists today. The
commentaries to the Rwandan Organic Law outline the goals of punishment in
Rwandan law as follows: "to punish the guilty, serve as a dissuasive example,
protect the people and rehabilitate the accused., 77 The trials that have taken
place so far do not bode well for the attainment of the larger goals ascribed to
penalties under both international law and the domestic law of Rwanda.
73 Though there is something unfair about mapping the cultural and legal traditions of one country onto
another, research on the death penalty in the United States has shown how deciphering the legal and popular
meaning of innocence can be influenced by existing social cleavages (i.e., ethnicity). Melynda J. Price,
Litigating Salvation: Race, Religion and Innocence in the Karla Faye Tucker and Gary Graham Cases, 15 S.
CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 267 (2006).
74 See id. at 282-83.
75 See PRUNIER, supra note 71, at 323.
76 See Robert F. Van Lierop, Report on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 3 HOFSTRA L.
& POL'Y SYMP. 203, 212 (1999).
77 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE STUDY AND THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INFORMATION,
THE GENOCIDE AND THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RWANDA LAW, COMMENTARY 27-28,42 (1997).
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Rwandans are frustrated with the slow pace of trials.78 Individual
accountability is also about justice for the victims. The meager attempts at
trials in Rwanda have done little to provide solace or compensation for those
who were injured or lost loved ones.79 This frustration is further fueled by
claims of reprisals against witnesses by interahamwe inside and outside of
Rwanda.80 The current formation of the interahamwe is unclear, but they "are
far more than just a ghost from Rwanda's bloody past.' 81 The occurence of the
debate in the midst of continued armed conflict between Hutu rebels and the
RPF makes it extremely difficult to know what the impact of such trials has
been or what the future impact of imposing death sentences will be on the rule
of law in Rwanda.
Even if one were able to remedy the structural problems rampant in the
domestic prosecutions in Rwanda, there remains the issue of the discrepancy
between the sentences that could be imposed on these individuals as opposed
to those who orchestrated the genocide. Are these individuals more culpable?
Their crimes are arguably not any more severe than those being tried before the
ICTR. The definition of genocide in Rwandan law is the same as that in
international law. 82  The acceptance of this definition of genocide should
produce equal treatment of those on trial in Rwanda and those before the
ICTR.
B. Jean Kambanda
In April 1994, Jean Kambanda was the Prime Minister of Rwanda. In
September 1998, he became the first head of state to be prosecuted in an
international proceeding for the crime of genocide and sentenced to life in
78 Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994,
18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 181 (2000).
79 See generally Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact
on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251 (2007).
80 As of 1999, "[o]ver 300 survivors of the genocide who were scheduled to testify in criminal
proceedings have been murdered." Van Lierop, supra note 76, at 220.
81 Salopek, supra note 62. There was estimated to have been 5,000 interahamwe prior to the genocide.
Their ranks swelled as the violence of the genocide escalated. Those who are not detained have been forced
into the jungles of the Congo, causing significant problems in an already protracted conflict in that country.
Id. See also Van Lierop, supra note 76, at 231 (noting that "[tihe political fallout from the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda has been a major catalyst in the upheaval now wrenching apart the Congo and threatening to cause
more upheaval in neighboring countries as well").
82 Drumbl, supra note 25, at 577.
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prison.83  Kambanda confessed to "conspiring with other government leaders
to direct massacres, set up a network of roadblocks to trap Tutsis, arm the
population and militias and allow local authorities to oversee killing," and
"incit[ing] the population to kill Tutsis and their sympathizers." 84 As the first
high-level official even to admit to the massacres of 1994, Kambanda's
confession was extremely important to the ICTR's progress and the domestic
trials for genocide in Rwanda, as well as for its historical precedent in
international law.
85
Kambanda was prosecuted for more than his position as prime minister at
the time of the genocide. He openly encouraged Hutus to root out and murder
Tutsis on Rwandan radio, the major form of communication in the country.86
Kambanda is said to have "witnessed systematic killings, [known] or should
have known that massacres were taking place, failed to use the powers of his
office to protect his countrymen, and [done] nothing to stop government
officials and army officers who were under his authority from organizing and
directing the slaughter."87 He is also accused of having "ordered roads to be
blocked, knowing that this would trap fleeing refugees and result in their
certain death or injury."88  Kambanda signed and issued directives legalizingthe death squads that roamed the hills of Rwanda during the genocide. 89
83 Marlise Simons, War Crimes Court Rejects Rwandan's Appeal of Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2000, at AlO. Saddam Hussein was also a head of state tried for genocide, but in an Iraqi national court rather
than an international forum. Edward Wong, Hussein Charged with Genocide in 50,000 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2006, at Al.
84 Stephen Buckley, Ex-Leader in Rwanda Admits to Genocide, WASH. POST, May 2, 1998, at Al.
85 See Ann M. Simmons, Ex-Rwandan Premier Admits Genocide Role, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al.
Kambanda provided some ninety hours of videotaped evidence, which will be used against twenty-three "high-
profile, but lower-ranking defendants" before the Tribunal. Id. Denial of the events that occurred was the
anticipated foundation for the defenses of other defendants before the ICTR, as well as a substantial portion of
those being detained in Rwanda. Id. Rakiya Omar, Director of African Rights, suggested that Kambanda's
plea was "likely to create a panic among the suspects both in Rwanda and at the tribunal because their whole
philosophy, their ideology-to deny that there was a genocide-is no longer valid." Stephen Buckley, A Top
Hutu Pleads Guilty to Genocide, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 2, 1998, at News 1. The Rwandan genocide
prosecutions have been the most expansive in trying media personalities and operators for the incitement of
genocide. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahima, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 557 (2006).
86 Simmons, supra note 85.
87 John M. Goshko. Rwandan Given Life Term for Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1998, at Al.
88 Simmons, supra note 85.
89 James C. McKinley, Ex-Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison on Charges of Genocide in '94
Massacres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A4.
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Some have viewed Kambanda's reluctant plea as a pivotal moment in the
functioning of the ICTR.9° The fact that Kambanda acknowledged the murders
detracted from the ability of others charged with crimes stemming from the
same violence to deny participation. 91 Kambanda's confession was entered
almost four years after the genocide in Rwanda.92  Kambanda's story changed
substantially from his arrest in Kenya in 1997 to the time of his conviction.
93
In 1994, Kambanda and other high-level officials claimed that "the massacres
were a spontaneous reaction, an unpredictable and uncontrollable tribal killing
in response to the murder of President Habyarimana." 94  If the purpose of the
trials in the Tribunal and in Rwanda is to stem the culture of impunity in
Rwanda, the incremental progress represented by the Kambanda confession
offers little hope of achieving that purpose. Since Kambanda's confession was
not accompanied by any reduction in his sentence, there was some concern
about it being an impediment to securing confessions from others before the
Tribunal, which makes the Tribunal's work more difficult.
95
Kambanda appealed his conviction, primarily contesting the sentence,
which he claimed disregarded the mitigating circumstances.96  The ICTR hasgoals similar, in terms of punishment, to Rwandan domestic law. The goals of
90 James C. McKinley, Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Gets Life Term for Genocide, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 5, 1998, at News 6. Kambanda suggested that "as prime minister, he had to take the rap." James C.
McKinley, Ex-Premier Admits He Led Massacres in Rwanda in 1994, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al
[hereinafter Ex-Premier]. The ICTR has primacy over Rwandan domestic law, so Kambanda could not be
retried in Rwanda. ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 8.
91 See Simmons, supra note 85.
92 Id.
93 The following is Kambanda's account prior to his arrest of the happenings in Rwanda:
My government didn't plan or execute these massacres. I should be the first to know as head of
my government. If there is any member of my government suspected of planning the massacres,
he should be investigated, and if the facts are there he should be tried. But I don't like the idea of
anyone saying my government planned or executed massacres.
Chris McGreal, From Reluctant Premier to Mass Murderer, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 6, 1998, at 26.
94 Chris McGreal, Blood on Their Hands, OBSERVER (London), Dec. 3, 1994, at T40.
95 See Goshko, supra note 87. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the Prime Minister's attorney
argued for leniency in light of the confession and pledged future cooperation as a witness against other
officials in cases before the Tribunal. Chief Judge Laity Kama of Senegal summarized the reasons for the
Tribunal's rejection of leniency: "Jean Kambanda abused his authority and the trust of the population. Nor has
he expressed any contrition, regret or sympathy for the victims of Rwanda even when given the opportunity."
Buckley, supra note 85. See also Simmons, supra note 85; UN Court Hands Down First Sentence for
Genocide, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1998, at Cl7; Ex-Premier, supra note 90, at Al. The reluctance to participate
in confession procedures was also observed in Rwanda. A comprehensive study of the prisoners in Rwanda
found that few prisoners knew of anyone whose sentence had been reduced after confession and were therefore
unwilling to do so themselves. See Drumbel, supra note 41, at 1281.
96 Simons, supra note 83.
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the Tribunal, as articulated by the court in Kambanda, are to "prosecute and
punish the perpetrators of the atrocities in Rwanda in such a way as to put an
end to impunity and thereby to promote national reconciliation and restore
peace., 97 Are Kambanda's actions appreciably different from those of the
interahamwe? His hands did not wield a machete during the genocide, but
they are arguably no less bloody.
The role of Kambanda relative to that of the interahamwe raises two
questions. First, could he have stopped the violence in April 1994 if he had
tried? It may not have been possible. The exact details of his rise to power are
unclear, but it was not by referendum. He was an attractive candidate for the
job because he was a member of the extremist party and a high-level official
prior to death of Habyarimana. 98 But conscription into office does not explain
his enthusiastic participation in the violence that followed. The participation
of someone of Kambanda's status raises the question of whether heads of state
are always complicit when crimes of such monumental proportions occur
within their borders. Genocide is defined by both the quantity of people
murdered, as well as the qualitative nature of the crime.99
The facts of Kambanda's case make the question of his complicity easy,
but it does not sit well as precedent if this heightened level of knowledge and
participation is the standard for further prosecutions of heads of state. The
Tribunal notes the violation of trust inherent in the relationship between the
head of state and the citizenry. 1°° It is this element of trust that makes
Kambanda arguably more culpable than the interahamwe. Through the concept
of command responsibility, international law has recognized this additional
level of complicity at least since World War 1.1l Yet, Kambanda's life will
97 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 9126 (Sept. 4, 1998).
98 See Simmons, supra note 85.
99 Under the ICTR statute, genocide is defined as: "any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group":
(a) Killing members of the group
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 2.
100 Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S,9 44.
101 In the case of General Iwane Matsui, the ranking officer who perpetrated the "Rape of Nanking," the
court states clearly that a commander or any other actor in a supervisory position will be held criminally liable
for his failure to ensure that his troops act within the law. Linda A. Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 580 2007
BALANCING LIVES
be spared. Kambanda's punishment is distinct even from those who are not
sentenced to death in Rwanda. First, the conditions of imprisonment in Kigali
still suggest that Kambanda enjoys a better fate than they. 1°2  Under
international law, Kambanda is serving his sentence in a prison that meets the
international humanitarian rules for confinement-conditions which many
international observers say have not been met in Rwanda. 103 The second issue
is one of parity or proportionality. If one does not view Kambanda as having
greater culpability, the discrepancies between the punishment of Kambanda
and the interahamwe raises an important question about the fairness of two
defendants who have been found guilty of the same crime receiving two
different sentences.
The distinction is the overwhelming objection to the death penalty from
powerful nations in the United Nations. The power of those U.N. Member
States that oppose the death penalty is so strong that the United States, which
continues to practice the death penalty, pointed directly to the political
Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.
U. INT'L L.J. 319, 321 (1996). Unlike Matsui, Kambanda was not regular military. The argument for
Kambanda's complicity based on command responsibility is that once he legalized the interahamwe, he
essentially made himself the commander of those groups. There is also evidence that he controlled their
actions prior to assuming the role of Prime Minister. The wholesale adoption of the concept of command
responsibility in international law has been questioned on whether it is in line with the fundamental principle
of just desserts. See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. Comp. L.
455 (2001).
102 See Phil Clark, When the Killers Go Home, DISSENT, Summer 2005, at 14. In 1994, the RPF arrested
nearly 120,000 Hutus and imprisoned them in a facility built to house 40,000 people. Few were formally
charged and all were held in conditions that violated all international humanitarian rules for confinement.
They were "underfed, drinking dirty water, [and] crammed into tiny rooms where they slept on top of one
another in latticework formation." Id.
103 Simons, supra note 83. Kambanda is currently serving his sentence in a prison in Mali. Nancy
Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence
Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 115 n.231 (2006). The United Nations made an agreement with Mali to
enforce the punishment handed down by the ICTR. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Mali and the United Nations on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Feb. 12, 1999, 2122 U.N.T.S. 243. The agreement requires the government of the requested state to
meet the "Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for the Protection
of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of
Prisoners." Id. at 243. The United Nations made a similar agreement with Benin. See Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Benin and the United Nations on the Enforcement of Sentences of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Aug. 26, 1999, 2122 U.N.T.S. 231. There are no such
requirements for the treatment of those detained in Rwanda's prisons. As recently as May 2006, claims of
adults and children being held in "deplorable conditions" in makeshift prisons have been reported. Human
Rights Watch, Rwanda: Hundreds Illegally Detained in Former Warehouse, May 15, 2006, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2006/05/12/rwandal3369.htm.
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impossibility of establishing the ICTR if it had a death penalty. 104 The kind of
political intrusion that would be required to say that the death penalty should
be prohibited in Rwanda represents one of the fears of states wary of too much
power in the hands of international bodies. This makes a discussion about the
death penalty, even under the deplorable conditions that it will be imposed in
Rwanda, extremely difficult. The resolution of this question has led to the
current punishment paradox in the adjudication of the genocide in Rwanda and
potentially in other states where the policy on the death penalty is contrary to
the majority of the international community.
III. Is DEATH THE APPROPRIATE FORM OF PUNISHMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL
PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
The idea that imposing the death penalty supports reconciliation or any of
the other goals of accountability in human rights law would have greater
credence had Rwanda actively carried out state-sanctioned executions prior to
1994. The Rwandan Penal Code provided for capital punishment, but there are
several factors that suggest Rwanda had moved away from imposing the death
penalty. First, until the post-genocide period, Rwanda had not imposed the
death penalty since 1982, even though there were numerous instances of extra-
legal violence. 10 5 Second, President Habyarimana, whose death sparked the
events of April 1994, had commuted all existing death sentences in 1992.16
Additionally, as part of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords, the Rwandan
government agreed to ratify the Second Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
(ICCPR), although ratification was never completed. 1°7 The RPF, which
currently controls the Rwandan government, called for the abolition of the
death penalty as part of its platform. 10 8  Lastly, at the time the ICTR was
104 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2, at 17. Madeline Albright, the U.S. ambassador and the
President of the Security Council at the time the resolution was passed, offered the following statement:
"While we understand their [Rwanda's] concerns regarding several key issues-indeed on the death penalty
we might even agree-it was simply not possible to meet those concerns and still maintain broad support in
the Council." id.
105 William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV.
733, 766 (1997).
106 id.
107 Id. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
prohibits the execution of anyone in a state within the jurisdiction of the treaty. HARRIS, supra note 49, at 646.
108 Schabas, supra note 53, at 47.
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established, Rwanda was considered to be a de facto abolitionist state by the
United Nations.1
0 9
Although the Tutsi-led government claims otherwise, the imposition of the
death penalty for genocide appears to be an effort to legitimize the same
violence done -3xtra-legally by the Hutus prior to 1994. The absence of basic
due process or any resemblance of fairness further supports this view. The
current Rwandan government proclaims that it is not looking for revenge, but
this statement is hard to reconcile with the reality of the situation of those
being detained in Kigali. l l0 Even in countries that support the death penalty,
assembling inmates on a soccer field for a public execution is outside of the
bounds of legitimate state action. The Rwandan government has taken steps to
retreat from such shows of violence; to demonstrate its commitment to the rule
of law, it has arrested more than 1,000 of its own soldiers." 1 These efforts,
married with the deficient conditions of the Rwandan justice system, are
insufficient to support the use of the death penalty for the crime of genocide in
this state.
IV. THE ICTR AND TRIALS IN RWANDA AS AFRICA'S NUREMBERG AND
EICHMANN
If the ICCPR and its subsequent documents are the measure, then there is at
least an international majority that views the death penalty as a human rights
issue and believes the employment of such punishment should be highly
scrutinized and severely limited.' 2 With the exception of Eichmann, the East
German Nazi Trial, and a few other trials from World War II, there had been
no executions of those found guilty of the crime of genocide other than those
that have taken place in Rwanda and possibly the recent execution of Saddam
Hussein." 3 Arguably, Hussein's execution could be indicative of a new wave
of domestic trials of those charged with human rights abuses.'14  In his
109 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Capital Punishment and Implementation of
the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, at 6, delivered to
the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/1995/78 (Mar. 9, 1995).
110 Simmons, supra note 85.
111 Van Lierop, supra note 76, at 216. Soldiers, including officers, have been arrested for revenge killings
and other more common crimes. Like the rest of those being detained, the soldier may or may not be charged
and may languish in prison in Rwanda. Id.
112 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2, at 15.
113 See Maggie Farley, His U.N. Honeymoon is Short-lived, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A4.
114 See id.
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comments after Hussein's execution, the new UN Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon reiterated the ongoing tension between domestic and international
humanitarian law on the death penalty, but unlike his predecessors he did not
take a hard line against its use in this instance.1 5 No one knows whether this
is a one-time execution of a convicted despot or a choice more states will make
to deal with past abuses. Eichmann and Nuremberg may still be the most
ready example(s) of the conflicting positions domestic and international law
have taken in their view/implementation of punishment. Rwanda appears to
follow a similar pattern, but diverges in ways that make it particularly
instructive for events unfolding on the African continent.
In her account of the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt argues that there was
so little opposition to Eichmann's hanging because those who opposed the
death penalty, though valid in their opposition, knew "that this was not a very
promising case on which to fight."'1 6  Arendt's acknowledgment of the
existence of opposition to this form of punishment at least breaks through the
faqade of consensus about the imposition of the death penalty in cases where
defendants are guilty of the most heinous crimes.
17
Nuremberg clearly establishes the crime of genocide as a violation of
international law-a crime against the international community and not simply
against individuals or individual states.1 8  One of the major criticisms of
Nuremberg was the issue of selective prosecution, or the failure to bring all
those guilty of genocide to trial.19 The government of Israel sought to correct
this problem by locating and extraditing several high-profile Nazi criminals to
Israel to be prosecuted. 20 The fairness of prosecution without the participation
of other states was questioned both during and after the Eichmann trial in
Israel, as well as similar trials of Nazis under domestic genocide laws in other
countries. 121 Punishment for those found guilty in domestic courts varied, but
115 Id. Ban's comments on Saddam Hussein's execution were among his first as the new U.N. Secretary
General. Id. Ban stated, "the issue of capital punishment is for every member state to decide," but "at the
same time, [he] hoped that the international member states would pay due regard to all aspects of humanitarian
law." Id. Ban is also from a state-South Korea-where the death penalty is legal, so this may be why he is
unwilling to go as far in opposing the death penalty as other who have held the job. Id. It is not yet clear what
tone Ban will take on the death penalty in his new role. See Colum Lynch, New U.N. Chief Defends the Death
Penalty for Hussein, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A5.
116 HANNAH ARENDT, A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL: EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 252 (1994).
117 id.
I Id. at255.
119 Id. at6-7.
120 id.
121 Id. at 258-59.
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the differences were not statutorily prescribed as in the ICTR and the Rwandan
Organic Law.
One could analogize the genocide trials taking place in Rwanda as multiple
versions of the trial of Eichmann and the ICTR as a current Nuremberg.
Arendt distinguishes Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem from Nuremberg and others
by the central role the Jewish people played in judging Eichmann. z2 There is
a strong argument that the Rwandans generally, and Tutsis specifically,
deserve the opportunity to impose a local sense of justice onto those who
committed atrocities. The refrain of "never again", adopted from the
Holocaust, is rampant in discussion about prosecution and punishment.' 23 In
the Security Council debates, the Rwandan representative used this very
rhetoric in opposition to a statute that would not allow for the death penalty.124
The representative consistently compared the suffering of the Tutsis to that of
Jews during WWH. 125 Arendt viewed Nuremberg as a tribunal "established for
war criminals whose crimes could not be localized," similar to the current
codification of genocide and crimes against humanity in international law.
26
She viewed the crimes of those tried at Nuremberg as being crimes without
geographic boundaries.
Alternatively, Rwanda seems like the best case for local punishment if the
predominant requirement for an international tribunal is that the crimes cross
state boundaries. The Rwandan genocide was largely confined within its
borders, though residual violence and fleeing interahamwe have been viewed
as responsible for crimes in neighboring countries. If one sets aside
Eichmann's death sentence to look solely at the process of the trial, Eichmann
stands as an example that this kind of trial can take place without abrogating
the defendant's due process rights and right to fairness.
There are several reasons why this analogy fails. The first is that unlike
Israel at the time of Eichmann's trial, Rwanda does not have the same history
of the rule of law. 127 Even if there were a longstanding history of the rule of
law, the judiciary was specifically targeted in the genocide, which placed strain
on the remaining court system. 128 If the international community agreed that
122 Id. at 6-7.
123 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2.
124 Id. at 13.
125 id.
126 ARENDT, supra note 116, at 258.
127 Schabas, supra note 31, at 531.
128 Id. at 533.
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the death penalty was acceptable, then it must also agree that implementation
requires a heightened level of due process protection and the authority of a
legitimate state. The reality of conditions in Rwanda is the strongest argument
against implementing the death penalty there for perpetrators of genocide.
A. The Role of Punishment
The sociological understanding of the role of punishment has evolved.
Emile Durkheim is credited with being the first to see punishment as more than
just a response to crime.'29 Durkheim has been read to construe punishment as
not only defining what is criminal, but also as having "positive social effects
such as reinforcing solidarity by symbolically displaying the collective
sentiments."' 30 Punishment then becomes a "system of signs" by which the
moral values of the society are communicated. 131 The ICTR and the Rwandan
courts both have a stated goal of countering the culture of impunity that existed
in Rwanda in 1994.132 Executions may placate the need for justice or
retribution among the survivors of the genocide, but what they reflect about the
collective sentiments of the Rwandan people is problematic if the ultimate goal
is true resolution of the problems that fomented the violence.
The willingness of the Security Council to give its prosecution primacy
over the Rwandan national courts may mean greater internationalization of the
crime of genocide. It is stronger support for the position that genocide is truly
a transnational crime against all humanity. If this is true, then the punishment
paradox in the instant case may also signal a need for a more structured theory
of the purpose and role of punishment in the international arena. The ad hoc
nature of the current Tribunal requires a constant renegotiation of the kind of
punishments to be employed.' 33  The establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which will develop its own common law understanding
of punishment, may correct some of this. However, the ICC would do little to
correct the possible asymmetries in punishment that may occur if countries
decide to prosecute perpetrators of genocide domestically, which international
law strongly encourages. These asymmetries are bound to persist until there is
129 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (1964); Emile Durkheim, Two
Laws of Penal Evolution, 2 ECON. & SOc'Y. 285 (1973).
130 ADRIAN HOwE, PUNISH AND CRITIQUE: TOWARDS A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF PENALITY 6 (1994).
131 David Garland, Durkheim's Theory of Punishment: A Critique, in THE POWER TO PUNISH;
CONTEMPORARY PENALITY AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 58-59 (David Garland & Peter Young eds., 1983).
132 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2.
133 See id. The existence of multiple ad hoc tribunals, with discussion about the punishment found in
each, demonstrates that punishments must be renegotiated when another tribunal is set up. Id.
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greater resolution on the issue of whether the death penalty should be used at
any level, at any time. The execution of Saddam Hussein and the failure of the
leader of the primary international organization-the United Nations-to take
a clear position on the death penalty exemplify the confusion that exists over
the death penalty in practice.
One could argue that the genocide in Rwanda, where killing is localized
and results from the ethnic conflict among the citizens of a single state, may be
simply communicating the pathologies of that society: therefore the forms of
punishment employed domestically do not need to mirror the values of the
international community. In a statement to the Security Council prior to voting
against the formation of the ICTR, Mr. Bakuramutsa, the Rwandan
representative asserted:
The Rwandese who were taught that it was acceptable to kill as long
as the victim was from a different ethnic group or from an opposition
party, cannot arrive at national reconciliation unless they learn new
values. The national reconciliation of the Rwandese can be achieved
only if equitable justice is established and if the survivors are assured
that what has happened will never happen again. 134
The question is how this lesson can be taught and who makes this decision. In
Rwanda, the answer to the question is still evolving. With other conflicts such
as the one in Sudan, and possibly more prosecutions in Iraq, the possibility
exists of more tribunals in the future. Also looming is the process of
identifying mechanisms for punishment that will reconcile the interests of both
the international community and the victims of the atrocities.
B. Maybe it Takes a Village to Stop Genocide: Traditional Courts as a
Solution to Delays in Justice for Rwandan Genocide Victims
One of the solutions to the call for justice in Rwanda is the use of new
methods of justice and reconciliation in the form of traditional courts. There
has been strong support for employing the gacaca-a tribal system of dispute
resolution-as a way of speeding the process of the large number of detainees
who have strained the already meager resources of the Rwandan
government. 35  The gacaca "operates at a grass-roots level, with local
134 Id. at 14.
135 Alana Erin Tiemessen, After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-genocide Rwanda, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 57,
58 (2004).
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communities settling differences through the election of sages and leaders who
endeavor to bring the parties together in the pursuit of communal justice.' ' 36
Gacaca is sometimes referred to as "judgment on the grass."' 37  The
hearings are presided over by inyangamugayo ("wise men" in Kinya-rwanda),
"refer[ring] to people untainted by the 1994 massacres."'1 38 There are
approximately 10,000 gacaca courts in Rwanda.' 39 There are nine judges on
each panel with over 150,000 gacaca judges in Rwanda. 14  It is estimated that
regular courts would take 100 years to try all those arrested or accused of
participation in the genocide; the gacaca system could do it in eight.'
14
Gacaca, which is an attempt at restorative justice, "is founded on the principle
that the community should reintegrate the individuals whom it punishes."'
142
The focus on a system of justice that positively restores participants of
genocide to civil society runs counter to the punitive focus of the international
mechanism for dealing with genocide. Human rights groups and other
international organizations have recognized the inventiveness of this method of
adjudicating crimes of genocide. 143
However, there are those who are concerned that this return to "people's
justice" will not afford defendants the procedural protection of a conventional
criminal trial. 144 Gacaca is only available to those defendants charged with
crimes in Categories 3 and 4 of the Rwandan Organic Law (those charged with
theft and assault, as well as some charged with murder and manslaughter). 145
The implementation of the gacaca system ignores the potential benefits of state
prosecution. According to Jose Alvarez, "properly conducted" criminal trials
can "provoke socially desirable, if contentious, conversations in the hope that
through honest discourse the guilty will eventually come to recognize that
136 Mark A. Drumbl, Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y
288, 291-92 (2000).
137 Tiemessen, supra note 135, at 60.
138 Fawzia Sheikh, Trial and Error, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Dec. 2005, at 15.
139 Tiemessen, supra note 135.
140 Sheikh, supra note 138, at 17. More than 1000 of these judges have resigned between 2002 and 2005
because they were later accused of genocide. Id.
141 id.
142 Clark, supra note 102, at 14.
143 See Sheikh, supra note 138.
144 Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 355, 385 n.86 (2002).
145 Drumbl, supra note 41, at 1264. For further discussion of the domestic Rwandan genocide statutes, see
Drumbl, supra note 25.
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brutal killings are not morally ambiguous." 146 However, gacaca, in the eyes of
its supporters, initiates the process of release for the thousands who have been
detained since the 1994 violence from conditions of confinement that have led
to additional human rights violations. 1
47
Rwanda's ability to afford defendants properly conducted criminal trials
seems questionable. This resource problem has led to the reincarnation of the
gacaca system. 48 Gacaca may be a way to provoke the reparative discourse
that Alvarez comtemplates without sapping the minimal resources of the
Rwandan government, as would properly implemented criminal trials.
However, gacaca was not originally developed to handle the complexity of
genocide situations. 49 It has yet to be seen whether this system can adequately
protect the civil rights of defendants.' 50 It might be quite effective when
perpetrators are accused of property crimes. A gacaca court in a district in
Eastern Rwanda sentenced 102 people guilty of crimes during the 1994
genocide to rebuild houses destroyed in the violence.' 5 1 The program to which
these defendants were sentenced allows genocidaires to participate in work
beneficial to the community while receiving "lessons on unity and
reconciliation" in camps, which leads eventually to reintegration.1
52
Another benefit of gacaca is its return of the justice process directly to the
people who were harmed. Defendants are tried in the villages where their
crimes were committed and everyone can participate.' 53  This kind of re-
146 Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 406
(1999).
147 See Daly, supra note 144, at 369-70.
141 See id. at 369.
149 See Drumbl, supra note 41, at 1265. Gacaca traditionally has been used to "adjudicate small property
disputes and petty theft." Id.
150 id.
151 Over 100 Rwandans Charged with Genocide to Build Houses for Survivors, BBC MONITORING, July
20, 2006 [hereinafter Rwandans Charged].
152 Id. The release of detainees has also negatively affected some victims of the genocide who feel "re-
traumatized" by the return of genocidaires to villages. See Clark, supra note 102, at 17. According to one
survivor:
It is frightening for us survivors to see these people back here. Can we trust them not to repeat
what they did to us before? They might not have received enough lessons from the government
[in solidarity camps] .... For most of us survivors, the release was a mockery. Haven't we
suffered enough already?
Id. at 18. The Rwandan government has trained a small number of counselors to help victims who continue to
find the performance of everyday activities difficult, but they are little relief for the overwhelming need for
psychological services. Id. at 17.
153 Daly, supra note 144, at 376.
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 589 2007
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
integration is extremely important in Rwanda, where there is an increased level
of familiarity between perpetrator and victim and any peace would require that
they live in close proximity. 154 Because the crimes of Category 1 defendants-
the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors, and leaders of genocide or
crimes against humanity; notorious murderers; and persons who committed
acts of sexual torture-are not processed through gacaca, the death penalty is
not available. 155 This may not always be the case. In early 2006, the Rwandan
government announced that it may allow Category 1 defendants to be tried in
gacaca courts. 156 The gacaca system, which signaled progress on the part of
the Rwandan government to expedite the domestic adjudication of low-level
participants in the genocide, may confirm the international community's worst
fears about the death penalty if these courts, which offer little to no procedural
protections, begin handing out death sentences.
The African proverb "it takes a village" may be exactly what Rwanda
needs to satisfy the victim's need for justice and to achieve the reintegration of
those who participated in the genocide (for all but those identified in Category
1 of the Rwandan Organic Law). Though gacaca courts have been slow to
begin their work for various reasons, they are seen in Rwanda as a mechanism
to mitigate what many Rwandans have viewed as the ICTR's lack of justice. 157
The distance of the Tribunal from Rwanda-both geographically and in terms
of its impact on the ground-has done little in terms of reconciliation, which is
the ultimate goal of punishment for genocide under both regimes.158 Gacaca is
purported to be a "populist response to a populist genocide."' 159 But if these
courts are allowed to try Category 1 defendants and sentence them to death,
gacaca may not be the answer to this community's crisis.
154 id.
155 Rwandans Charged, supra note 151.
156 Paul Willis, No Lawyer But Rwanda's Village Courts Could Pass Death Sentence, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 9, 2006, at 26.
157 Alvarez, supra note 146, at 418.
158 See David Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 505, 512 (2006). In his
evaluation of the war crimes tribunals for the violence in Sierra Leone's civil war, Crane argues that "a
tribunal is most effective when it is located in the region of the conflict." Id.
159 Daly, supra note 144, at 381. Prosecutors in other tribunals have emphasized the importance of
incorporating local culture into the international response to human rights abuses as well. In his reflections on
the Sierra Leone prosecutions, Crane argues that "consideration of regional cultures establishes confidence in
the rule of law. The people have to understand that the justice we are seeking is the justice that will aid them
in restoring their societies to a proper balance." Crane, supra note 158, at 513.
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There are several important critiques of gacaca that go beyond the lack of
procedural safeguards. The first and most obvious problem is that the
participants in the process may not be truthful.161 There is also significant
concern about fear preventing witnesses from testifying. 162 In the case of rape,
it is not just fear of the public shame associated with sexual violence, but also
fear of physical retribution for testifying in the proceedings.' 63 Those who
oppose these courts fear that they will reignite the ethnic violence that led to
their formation "by creating renewed confrontations between neighbors, by
opening up the wounds of the past, by eliciting abuses by powerful people, and
by excluding many crimes de facto."' 64 The concern about renewed ethnic
tension stems from the concern that the proceedings of the gacaca will be
viewed as "victor's justice," where guilt will be based on ethnic
membership. 165 Irdnde Bugingo of the Institute of Research on Dialogue and
Peace in Kigali asserts that there is already a clear belief among the mostly
Hutu refugee population that "gacaca is not going to succeed because it is
trying only Hutus." 166  There is concern that the current government has
unclean hands, which renders it unsuitable for, and uninterested in, the task of
bringing the truth to light; this could further complicate the efforts to utilize
gacaca as an alternative to traditional forms of prosecution.167
One of the Rwandan criticisms of the ICTR was that "the establishment of
so ineffective an international tribunal would only appease the conscience of
the international community rather than respond to the expectation of the
Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in particular. ' 68 The political
environment surrounding the establishment of the ICTR tends to support this
view, but these are two distinct issues. Establishing a tribunal like the ICTR
requires a consensus among several states, which requires compromise. The
expectations of the people of Rwanda is an issue separate from the
commitments of the U.N. Member States to certain principles of governance
160 See Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANcE 219, 227 (2003).
161 id.
162 id.
163 See Sheikh, supra note 138, at 16. There have been numerous cases of threats against witnesses and
several trials for the murder of witnesses. Id.
164 Uvin & Mironko, supra note 160, at 227.
165 Tiemessen, supra note 135, at 68.
166 Sheikh, supra note 138, at 16.
167 Constance Morrill, Show Business and 'Lawfare' in Rwanda: Twelve Years After the Genocide,
DISSENT, Summer 2006, at 15.
168 Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 2, at 15.
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and law. If gacaca is successful, it may be able to allay concerns over a lack
of justice for victims of the genocide and those who have been unfairly
detained in Rwandan prisons. Only time will tell if "the village" is an
appropriate place to adjudicate crimes of genocide, which have come to be
understood as crimes against humanity and crimes that extend across the
borders of the nation-state.
V. THE PUNISHMENT PARADOX IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
As of this writing, there is still armed conflict in Rwanda. The national
government has yet to gain control of portions of the country. Many of the
detainees view their actions as part of this continued conflict.169 When asked
why they are in prison, they will allude to their actions in "the war.' 70 Many
do not express remorse or view their actions as wrong. 171 After executing
thousands, the government has still failed to counter the culture of impunity
that led to the violence of 1994 or the violence that preceded it. Until there is a
clear peace, it is difficult to know the impact of such trials and whether
reconciliation is possible.
It is not clear that the trials either domestically in Rwanda or in the ICTR
have had any deterrent effects. 172 This is not just a problem for Rwanda. 173
Consistent in the discourse about criminal sanctions for human rights
violations is the need to set examples. Judge Kama has said, "Kambanda's
sentence will serve as a message to the entire international community,
particularly those who will be tempted to commit such crimes in the future.', 174
As the emphasis in human rights law re-orients its focus to the individual,
conflicts about the appropriateness of the sanctions that can be imposed are
bound to arise. The macro-effects of economic sanctions, which are borne by
entire countries, are less likely to raise such issues because the penalties are, at
least theoretically, dispersed more widely throughout the population. The
death penalty, which must be focused on the individual, who is vested with a
highly articulated set of rights under international law and most domestic legal
169 Drumbl, supra note 25, at 607.
170 Id.
171 id.
172 See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 7, 9 (2001). Deterrence is an extremely difficult concept to measure. Id.173 See id. Other research has found that both the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia contributed significantly to the process of restoring peace in both societies. id.
174 Simmons, supra note 85, at A4.
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regimes, complicates the decision to impose such sanctions. The death penalty
is also accompanied by complicated and conflicting data on whether it has any
deterrent effects.
Countries where the death penalty is still practiced generally accept that the
death penalty has no deterrence value. 175  To say that the shift is toward
individual accountability does little to define the appropriate sanctions. The
kind of punishment required to hold individuals accountable for such heinous
crimes is still up for discussion. The Rwandan government has interpreted
individual accountability to mean death to those who are guilty of certain
levels of participation in genocide. 176 Under current international law, Rwanda
is well within its rights to allow for the death penalty,' 77 but until significant
improvements occur in the policing of due process rights, it remains out of step
with other aspects of criminal prosecution prescribed by international law.
VI. POSSIBILITIES FOR RECONCILING DIFFERING VIEWS OF PUNISHMENT AT
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVELS (LESSONS FROM RWANDA)
Although it is not crystal clear that there is an international norm against
the death penalty,178 the ICCPR and associated documents suggest a strong
preference against its use.' 7 9 The inability to reach a resolution leaves open the
possibility for what is happening in Rwanda, as well as what has happened in
Iraq. 80  Preservation by influential countries of the death penalty distracts
from situations like Rwanda where due process violations make the imposition
of the death penalty under those circumstances highly questionable. Until the
abolitionist perspective gains greater support, different views on punishment
will continue to cause paradoxes where international and domestic laws share
175 For an example of the debate over the deterrent effects of capital punishment in the United States, see
Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New
Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 151 (2005). See also Hugo A. Bedau, DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN
THE MORALITY, LAW AND POLrrIcS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) (finding no difference in the deterrence
effects of the death penalty and life imprisonment); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital
Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life.life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 713 (2005).
176 See Carroll, supra note 78, at 177.
177 See Bentele, supra note 13, at 297-98.
178 Id.
179 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 430.
t80 Though there was much criticism of how Saddam Hussein was executed, both leaders who opposed
and those who supported the death penalty reiterated the right of Iraq as a "sovereign" nation and the victims
of Hussein's violent rule to determine his fate. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Despite Misgivings, White House Says
Little Against Hangings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007 at A8. See also Andrew Woodcock, Blair Says Execution
Wrong, PM to Break Silence on Saddam Taunts, The LIVERPOOL DAILY POST, Jan. 8, 2007, at News 19.
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 593 2007
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction. This section of the Article discusses how the handling of the
Rwandan genocide at both levels of prosecution may be instructive in instances
where these punishment discrepancies exist. The lessons of Rwanda must be
understood because this scenario could reoccur soon.
A good candidate for a repetition of this punishment disparity is future
prosecutions in the case of the ongoing "ethnic cleansing" in Darfur.'
81
Similar to Rwanda, Sudanese violence is perpetrated by combined govemment
forces and an ethnic militia called the Janjaweed.182 Some estimate tens of
thousands of civilians have been killed in Darfur since 2003, and more than
two million Darfurians have been displaced by the violence.' 83  The U.N.
commission charged with investigating the violence found that "most attacks
were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians."' 84  In
addition to the wholesale killing of civilians, the Sudanese military and the
Janjaweed militia have engaged in "torture, enforced disappearances,
destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and
forced displacement, throughout Darfur."'
185
There is some disagreement as to whether the events in Darfur constitute
genocide,186 but a discussion has already begun suggesting the possibility of
prosecutions for the actions of the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed.'87
If the events in Darfur are later determined to be genocide, what is now only a
suggestion will definitely become prosecutions of state actors and members of
the Janjaweed militia at both the domestic and international levels. As of
2003, Sudan was considered a retentionist state, meaning that it permits
executions for murder. 188  Sudan, more than Rwanda, will challenge the
overwhelming disapproval of the death penalty among the majority of U.N.
181 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Q & A: Crisis in Darfur, May 24, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536.htm.
182 id.
183 id.
184 CNN.com, U.N. Report: Darfur Not Genocide, http://edition.cnn.com2005/WORLD/africa/01/31/
sudan.report.
185 id.
186 See id.
187 See, e.g., Justin Wagner, The Systematic Use of Rape as a Tool of War in Darfur: A Blueprint for
International War Crimes Prosecutions, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 193, 218 (2005). See also Nadia A. Deans,
Tragedy of Humanity: The Issue of Intervention in the Darfur Crisis, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1653, 1688
(2005); S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
188 Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (1 Jan. 2003), Apr.
2003, http:/www.anmesty.org/en/alfresco-asset/5f2cl 104-a365-1 ldc-9dO8-f145a8145o2b/act5OOO32003en.
pdf.
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Member States because Sudan currently executes minors under age 18 and
meets few of the minimal procedural requirements outlined by the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.1 89 Sudan likely will not
be the last place where there is a difference in international and domestic views
on punishment.
A. Forcing a Change in Domestic Policy: The Case for the International
Community Holding the Line on the Death Penalty
As preparations begin for potentially transferring the remaining prisoners at
the ICTR to Rwanda, the willingness of the Rwandan government to abolish
the death penalty seems to indicate that the call for the death penalty in the
immediate post-genocide period was connected more to retaliation than to a
commitment to justice. 190 The decision to abolish the death penalty is based on
the desire to have access to the leaders of the Rwandan genocide.' 9' The U.N.
Security Council has agreed that the ICTR will finish prosecuting by 2008 and
will finish all appeals by 2010.192 Not all who are currently in ICTR custody
can be tried within this time frame. 193 The ICTR negotiated with courts in
countries that have "abolished the death penalty and have modern prisons that
are up to international standards."' 9 4 Rwanda was one of only two countries
that expressed a desire to receive cases of accused genocide perpetrators, but
the ICTR said that Rwanda must guarantee that no one would be sentenced to
death. 95 This is a success for the international community.
The existence of the death penalty in Rwanda has led to additional legal
and political issues in the prosecution of participants in the Rwandan genocide.
ICTR detainees and their lawyers argued that the transfer to Rwanda "was
tantamount to a death sentence and a violation of the U.N. Security Council
189 Human Rights Watch, Sudan.: Detainees Suffer Arbitrary Arrest, Execution, Sept. 7, 2005, http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2005/09/07/sudan I 1693.htm.
190 Aimable Twahirwa, Rwanda: Country to Scrap Death Penalty in Hunt for Genocide Suspects, E. AFR.,
Sept. 5, 2006, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200609050216.html [hereinafter Rwanda to Scrap Death
Penalty]. The motivation for the change in policy is extradition of the "masterminds" of the genocide from
European countries who have refused the transfers because of Rwanda's death penalty statute. id.
191 See Aimable Twahirwa, Rwanda: Public Wants Revenge; Government Will Settle for Justice, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 31, 2006.
192 Rwanda: ICTR Detainees Protest on the First Day of Rwanda Officials' Visit, HIRONDELLE NEWS
AGENCY, Sept. 20, 2004 [hereinafter ICTR Detainees Protest].
193 See Twahirwa, supra note 191.
194 id.
195 id.
20071
HeinOnline  -- 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 595 2007
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
statutes which created the tribunal."' 196  This has prompted other countries to
volunteer to host the detainees. 197 There have also been disputes between the
Rwandan government and the Tribunal over prosecutions. Each body has
alleged corruption, intimidation of witnesses, and inefficiencies on the part of
the other.' 98  The issue of transferring ICTR detainees to Rwanda forces the
United Nations to confront one of the primary reasons the Rwandan
representative voted against the original statute: differing views on the
appropriate punishment for those convicted of genocide.
The conflict over extradition is not without controversy in Rwanda. The
decision by the Rwandan government to abolish the death penalty has been
applauded in the international community, but heavily criticized by groups
representing survivors of the genocide. Francis Ngarambe, president of
Tbuka199 (a genocide survivor group), argues that "those who carried out the
genocide should be executed in order to forever eradicate the culture of
impunity that has always marred Rwanda." 2°° The view that the death penalty
is the only way to prevent renewed violence is held by many in Rwanda, but
others believe the best way to prevent further violence is to follow
international norms. 201  Though it is difficult to find polling data on the
particular question, Rwandan officials maintain that the majority of Rwandan
citizens support retaining the death penalty. 202  The debate raises interesting
questions about the internationalization of domestic genocide and whose sense
of justice should prevail.
196 ICTR Detainees Protest, supra note 192.
197 Id. Detainees are currently imprisoned in Mali; several other countries, including France, have offered
to take some of the detainees. Id.
198 Hans Nichols, Search for Justice Stalls in Rwanda: Government at Odds With the U.N. Court, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at A8. The ICTR accused the Rwandan government of "thwarting justice" for failing to
provide the appropriate visas for witnesses traveling to testify. The Rwandan government has consistently
attacked the legitimacy of the Tribunal on the grounds of "inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, lack of
protection of witnesses, harassment of witnesses, employing genocidaires as members of the defense team,
mismanagement [and] the slow pace of the trials." Id. This is only one example of a series of skirmishes
between the two. In 1999, the Rwandan government refused to extend a visa to Carla Del Ponte, who was then
Chief Prosecutor for the Tribunal. See id. The Rwandan government's criticism may be unwarranted on many
of the issues except for the pace of the prosecutions in the ICTR. As of 2006, only twenty-eight people had
been tried. Of those, twenty-five have been convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Rwanda to Scrap Death Penalty, supra note 190.
199 Ibuka means "remember" in Kinya-rwanda. Rwanda to Scrap Death Penalty, supra note 190.
200 Id.
201 id.
202 Twahirwa, supra note 191.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 596 2007
BALANCING LIVES
Though the path to this outcome has been circuitous, if the Rwandan
government abolishes the death penalty, it will have come in line with the
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. One lesson from the punishment
disparities may be that the international community can transform the legal
policies of states by maintaining its commitment to particular punishment
regimes. Genocide creates an opportunity to infuse broken communities with a
new view of justice and the rule of law.
B. Forcing Inventive Solutions to Adjudicating Genocide: The Case for
Employing Traditional or Local Solutions
The novelty and uniqueness of gacaca in Rwandan history may mean that
this is not a possible solution in other genocidal situations. The slow pace of
the ICTR and its intention to begin returning detainees to Rwanda demonstrate
the limits of international solutions to domestic incidents of genocide. The
close proximity of the victims to the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda may
also require alternative approaches to reconciliation and punishment for the
sake of the long-term goals (e.g., preventing further violence, returning the rule
of law, and reconciliation). Gacaca, even with its critics, will be the primary
experience of justice for the victims of genocide in Rwanda. Though this
remedy may not be exportable, it demonstrates the potential power of looking
to local/traditional solutions to adjudicating genocide.
Employing local/traditional solutions should not necessarily be in lieu of
international prosecution, but it may offer the kind of immediate, visible justice
that helps to rebuild the social and political networks decimated by
genocide. 20 3 Even if these systems of justice run parallel to international
programs, they may support the long-term goals of returning the rule of law to
the countries where genocide has occurred. Tribunals, which are typically
removed from the country where the underlying events took place, may not be
able to deliver justice as expediently to the victims as local forums. Delays in
international and/or domestic prosecutions, even if unavoidable to ensure fair
and sufficient legal process, may actually work against creating stability. The
inability of the current Rwandan government to disentangle itself from the
ethnic conflict that has plagued this small nation is due in some part to the
perceived lack of fair prosecutions and justice.
203 See Theodor Meron, Reflections of the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100
AM. J. INT'L. L. 551, 560 (2006). The support of the ICTR prosecutions by the Rwandan government, except
when it attempted to probe alleged crimes by Tutsis, emphasizes how the work of criminal tribunals is
impacted by "national-political considerations." Id. at 561.
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However, gacaca's legacy may be to encourage the continued exploration
of remedies for genocide. As much as genocide is characterized by violence of
one group against another, it is also defined by the geo-political conditions of
the place where it occurs. Despite the development of permanent international
legal institutions, there may never be a single best solution to prosecuting
participants or reconciling post-genocide societies. In Rwanda, there seems to
be an attempt to draw on tools beyond those that have been utilized in the past.
We must wait to see if they are successful.
CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether justice for the Rwandan genocide victims has been
achieved if those most directly affected are dissatisfied with the punishment
meted out to perpetrators. One of the overarching purposes of criminal law is
to make those found guilty accountable for their actions, but in doing so
international law has been willing to place greater limits on punishment than
some domestic statutes. As long as the death penalty continues to be a part of
domestic criminal codes, the discrepancies in the prosecutions of the Rwandan
genocide will reoccur. The larger purpose of this Article is to explore not only
the practical issues, but also the philosophical concerns raised by different
punishment regimes for perpetrators accused of similar or the same crimes.
There have been many criticisms levied at both the domestic and international
prosecutions in the Rwandan genocide, but each has been instructive in its own
way of the amount of influence victims of genocide can have in shaping
international law and the way international norms can influence domestic legal
changes.
The 2006 announcement by the Rwandan government of its intention to
pass legislation abolishing the death penalty to facilitate the transfer of the
remaining ICTR detainees to Rwandan courts is a very real example of
international legal norms being incorporated into domestic law. International
observers still point to the lack of procedural safeguards in Rwanda as a major
roadblock to fair legal proceedings for the remaining detainees. However, this
change in policy on the death penalty is at least suggestive of a movement
toward more progressive legal practices that incorporate some international
norms. The growth of international law, especially human rights law, has been
driven fundamentally by the call for greater respect for, and recognition of,
individual integrity. The abolition of the death penalty by the Rwandan
legislature for practical reasons does not forestall the possibility of these
[Vol. 21
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policies aiding in the long-term eradication of impunity-the goals of both the
ICTR and the Rwandan Organic Law.
As international legal structures continue to develop in their handling of
genocide, it is important to recognize that innovations can occur on the
domestic level as well. Whether traditional adjudicative procedures like
gacaca can be exported to other locales where genocide occurs remains in
question. Even if it does not appear in future responses to genocide, the lesson
to be learned from this process is that traditional processes for allowing victims
to articulate publicly how they have been harmed and provide a scheme for
punishing those who have caused that harm should be used where possible.
The complete breakdown of law and order that results in genocide does not
mean that all previous legal and quasi-legal mechanisms are broken. The kind
of societal repair attempted by the ICTR and the Rwandan Organic Law may
be best promoted by utilizing familiar traditional procedures.
The difficulty of evaluating the implications of the various prosecution
regimes employed in the Rwandan genocide is the inability to isolate or
disconnect each incident from those in the past or from continuing legal and
historical developments. For instance, what will be the impact of the execution
of Saddam Hussein for human rights abuses by the Iraqi government and the
rather weak stance taken by the new Secretary-General of the United Nations
as compared to previous heads of that organization? Each prosecution of
genocide participants is impacted by the cumulative lessons of all those that
occurred prior. The debate over the death penalty in the Rwandan genocide
reveals the lack of domestic or international consensus on punishment and the
unclear position of genocide victims in the determination of justice in these
various forums. As the flaws of man continue to provide us with incidents of
genocide, reconciling the punishment discrepancies that have characterized
past prosecutions will continue to be important.
POSTSCRIPT
On July 25, 2007, the Rwandan government officially abolished the death
204penalty with the publication of a new law in the Official Gazette. The lawstates simply and clearly, "[t[he death penalty is hereby abolished., 20 5 The law
204 Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Organic Law No. 31/2007, in OFFICIAL
GAZETI'rE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA (July 25, 2007).
205 Id. art. 2.
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orders the substitution of "life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special
provisions" for "death penalty" in Rwandan Organic Law.206 Additionally, the
law retroactively converted all existing death sentences to "life imprisonment
or life imprisonment with special provisions." 20 7 This portion of the law
abolishes the death penalty for those prosecuted for, or accused of, genocide.
The new law also prohibits extradition of criminal defendants in Rwanda to
countries where the death penalty is lawful, unless the "applying Stateprodues frmal .... 208
produces formal guarantees that death penalty will not be executed. Each
of these provisions addresses directly the concerns of the international legal
community that have prevented the transfer of the remaining defendants to
Rwanda despite the formal conclusion of the ICTR proceedings. The opening
of the door for the return of these last defendants, who were high-level
participants in the genocide, may provide the kind of visible justice that will
prevent the repetition of violence. For now, Rwandans and the international
community will have to wait to see if the current government will adhere to the
new law and if this step indicates an effort on the part of the Rwandan
government to improve the quality of the proceedings for all those accused of
participation in the genocide. Some might read this as a sign of the potential to
create symmetry in domestic and international punishments for genocide.
However, as long as some domestic laws continue to allow for the death
penalty, the international community will continue to grapple with the
punishment paradox in genocide prosecutions.
206 Id. art. 3.
207 Id. art. 6.
208 id. art. 8.
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